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David B. Spence *
ABSTRACT
At the heart of the ideological conflict between the American political
parties lies a fundamental disagreement about regulation and the proper
relationship between government and markets. That conflict is partly about
the substance of regulatory policy and partly about the scope of regulatory
policymaking discretion. Both of these dimensions are implicated in a series
of relatively obscure disputes recently before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). The central question in these cases is whether it is fair
and constitutional for FERC to enforce Federal Power Act prohibitions
against energy market manipulation against the defendants, given that the
trading at issue violated none of the specific market rules established by the
overseers of the regional electricity market in which the defendants
operated. This dispute gets to the heart of a recurring and fundamental
conflict in modern regulatory politics: namely, that regardless of how
aggressively Republicans and conservatives pursue deregulation and
deconstruction of the administrative state, or how sharply Democrats and
progressives react to those aspirations, both parties’ agendas remain
constrained (at least for now) by extant legislative mandates. On the one
hand, federal regulatory agencies remain bound by public interest and
consumer protection obligations written into their enabling legislation; on
the other, they seem unlikely to abandon entirely their recent embrace of
competition and markets. This Essay argues that the fundamental challenge
to regulation represented by defendants’ position in these cases is
misguided, both legally and philosophically. It is legally misguided because
it ignores established principles of law supporting an agency’s general
power to enforce broad statutory mandates directly, on a case-by-case basis,
even when defendants have complied with more specific market rules.
Indeed, that regulatory prerogative is well established within electricity
market regulation as well. The defense is also philosophically misguided
because it ignores the reasons historically regulated markets were regulated
in the first place: namely, because real world markets often fail to maximize
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welfare in the ways textbook markets suggest, and because market failures
are very difficult for regulators to predict ex ante. In the modern world of
light-handed regulation, the central task facing regulatory agencies is to
capture the benefits of competition while steering competition toward public
interest goals. Given the fluidity and complexity of today’s markets, and the
magnitude of the particular changes facing robust, competitive, and
“decarbonizing” electricity markets, that task is Herculean: without the
broad authority to use adjudication to enforce public interest mandates, the
task becomes Sisyphean. Therefore, unless and until Congress is willing to
repeal the public interest mandates under which many regulatory agencies
operate, the task of reconciling competitive markets with public interest
mandates requires that agencies be able to enforce both broad statutory
mandates and specific market rules simultaneously, because in complex, real
world markets the market participants will always be several steps ahead of
specific market rules in ways that defeat important public interest goals.
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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the ideological conflict between the American political
parties lies a fundamental disagreement about regulation and the proper
relationship between government and markets. This conflict is twodimensional: it is partly about the substance of regulatory policy and partly
about the scope of regulatory policymaking discretion. Both of these
dimensions are implicated in a series of relatively obscure disputes recently
before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). At first blush,
these cases comprise a set of Federal Power Act 1 enforcement proceedings
(“the overcharge cases”) that involve arcane rules governing reimbursement
of energy traders for overcharges in electricity markets. 2 At the same time,
these cases implicate much more fundamental aspects of the governmentmarket relationship concerning enforcement discretion, due process
concerns, and how regulators can or should rely on markets to serve public
ends. This Essay explains how the overcharge cases implicate these issues
and argues that preserving the policy of using regulated competition to serve
public ends is a worthwhile task; but it is one that requires regulators have
the power and flexibility to monitor and tinker with market institutions
nimbly and flexibly, consistent with their statutory mandates. The defenses
being raised in these cases reflects a broader philosophy about governmentmarket relations that would threaten that authority.
The last four decades have seen a trend toward lighter-handed regulation
and more reliance on competition and markets across multiple sectors of the
economy, including airlines, 3 banking, 4 telecommunication, 5 natural gas, 6
and electricity. 7 That trend was driven in part by an increasing belief among
policymakers that market competition can produce public benefits; that
view, in turn, had its genesis in the work of public choice scholars whose
1

16 U.S.C. § 824.
These proceedings are FERC v. Powhatan Energy Fund, No. 3:15-cv-00452 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11,
2020); FERC v. City Power Mktg., No. 1:15-cv-01428 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2015); and FERC v. Coaltrain
Energy L.P., No. 2:16-cv-00732 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2016).
3
See Andrew R. Goetz & Timothy M. Vowles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 30 Years of US
Airline Deregulation, 17 J. OF TRANS. GEOGRAPHY 251, 251–52 (2009).
4
See Prasad Krishnamurthy, Banking Deregulation, Local Credit Supply, and Small-Business
Growth, 58 J.L. & ECON. 935, 936 (2015).
5
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Turning Points in Telecommunications History, 29 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUT. & INFO. L. 513, 524–25 (2012).
6
See William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation in
America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 772–75 (2018).
7
See Serverin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The US Electricity Industry After 20 Years of
Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 437 (2015).
2
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critiques of government and advocacy of efficient markets ultimately
commanded wide influence among conservative politicians and judges. 8 The
increased faith in markets and skepticism of government have driven the
Republican Party’s sharp move to the ideological right, 9 which has kept
deregulation on the agenda for Republican policymakers right up to the
present day. 10 At the same time, the election of Donald Trump seems to be
motivating increasing Democratic Party support for new regulatory
interventions in markets, as economic inequality and climate policy have
risen on Democrats’ policy priority list. 11 Policy conflict between the parties
around market-government relations is sharper than at any time in the
modern regulatory era. Progressives and Democrats seek a more muscular
regulatory state in the face of conservatives’ and Republicans’ aspirations to
deconstruct it. 12 However, whereas Democrats’ reconstruction project
depends on gaining control of the policymaking branches, Republicans’
deconstruction project is gaining traction in the courts in the form of judicial
interest in reviewing and revising doctrine governing judicial deference due
administrative agencies as they discharge their statutory duties. 13
8
One premise of this analysis is that public choice economics was and is a mostly sincere
expression of policy-relevant ideas, rather than mere ideological cover for the exercise of interest group
power. The latter idea has taken hold in recent public characterizations of the American government as a
“rigged system,” and in popular treatments of the history of public choice. See Jonathan Tamari, The
System Is ‘Corrupt,’ ‘Rigged,’ Not ‘for Working People’: Why 2020 Democrats Sometimes Sound a Bit
Like Trump, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 7, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/democrats-2020-populistrhetoric-donald-trump-elizabeth-warren-bernie-sanders-20190707.html. For examples of recent, popular
accounts of corporate/elite dominance (by way of public choice theory), see NANCY MACLEAN,
DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA
(2017); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY (2016). For an explanation of how methodological assumptions
employed by economists support jaundiced views of government and naïve views of markets, see David
B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973 (2017).
9
This idea is more fully developed at infra notes 111–117 and accompanying text.
10
The Harvard Environmental Law Project tracks Trump Administration regulatory “rollbacks”
on its website at https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/.
11
Frank Newport, The Environment, Climate Change in the News, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/267011/environment-climate-change-news.aspx.
12
See Zeke J. Miller, President Trump’s Lawyers Plan a White House Legal Attack on Federal
Agency Power, TIME (Mar. 13, 2017), http://time.com/4700311/donald-trump-white-house-counselsteve-bannon/ (describing a broad White House plan “to roll back regulatory powers across the U.S.
government”); James Hohmann, Ayn Rand Acolyte Donald Trump Stacks His Cabinet with Fellow
Objectivists, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016) (chronicling the affection of Donald Trump, Secretary of State
Rex Tillerson, and CIA Director Mike Pompeo for Ayn Rand’s ideas); Jonathan Chait, 7 Ways Paul Ryan
Revealed His Love for Ayn Rand, N.Y. MAG. (July 10, 2014) (describing Paul Ryan’s allegiance to Rand’s
philosophy); Steve Benen, The GOP’s Affinity for Ayn Rand Won’t Go Away, MSNBC,
https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/the-gops-affinity-ayn-rand-wont-go-away-msna683021
(Sept. 16, 2015) (chronicling Rand Paul’s and Ted Cruz’s professions of affection for Ayn Rand’s works).
13
A full exploration of these disputes over deference doctrines would (and does) require its own
article-length treatment, and so is beyond the scope of this Essay. For a recent academic discussion of

SPENCE_1.25.21

2021]

1/25/2021 9:24 AM

REGULATING COMPETITION

17

But regardless of how aggressively Republicans and conservatives
pursue deregulation and deconstruction of the administrative state, or how
sharply Democrats and progressives react to those aspirations, 14 all of these
agendas remain constrained (at least for now) by extant legislative mandates.
On the one hand, federal regulatory agencies remain bound by public interest
and consumer protection obligations written into their enabling legislation;
on the other, they seem unlikely to abandon entirely their recent embrace of
competition and markets. 15 It is this pro-regulatory default written into the
missions of regulatory agencies—during the New Deal and the regulatory
era stretching from the late 1960s through the 1970s 16—that motivates antiregulatory activists to conflate the battles over the substance of regulatory
policy with battles over regulators’ power. However, that conflation
becomes a source of confusion when regulators pursue conservative policy
ends or, as in the overcharge cases, choose to use markets and competition
as part of how they discharge their regulatory missions.

these issues, see infra note 153.
14
The increasing profile of bolder government initiatives in Democratic Party policy discourse—
ideas like “Medicare for All” or the “Green New Deal” are prominent examples—may reflect a backlash
on the left to laissez-faire conservativism. See Rex Santus, Medicare for All, a Green New Deal, and
Breaking Up Wall Street: Here’s What’s on Bernie Sanders’ 2020 Agenda, VICE (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kzdg3z/medicare-for-all-a-green-new-deal-and-break-up-wallstreet-heres-whats-on-bernie-sanders-2020-agenda. For an example of how conservatives view these
kinds of government-centric programs, see Niv Elis, Kudlow: Dem Push on Green New Deal, ‘Medicare
for All’ Would Shrink Economy by 15 Percent, THE HILL (Apr. 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/
finance/438425-kudlow-dem-push-on-green-new-deal-medicare-for-all-would-shrink-economy-by-15.
15
Since restructuring of electricity markets, FERC commissioners appointed by Republicans and
Democrats alike have embraced competition in wholesale electricity markets. Republicans favor it on
philosophical grounds, and Democrats embrace it because it forces reluctant investor-owned utilities to
allow (now-inexpensive) renewable generation to compete for wholesale customers. For example, Obama
appointee and former FERC chair Jon Wellinghoff promoted a series of FERC actions that facilitated the
entry of renewable generation (Order 764), demand response resources (Order 745), and battery storage
resources (Order 841) into competitive wholesale markets. See Integration of Variable Energy Resources,
139 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,246, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,481 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n July 13, 2012) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order No. 764); Demand Response Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets, 138 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,148, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,657 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Mar. 24, 2011) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order No. 745-B); Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 162 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,127, 83 Fed.
Reg. 9,580 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n June 4, 2018) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order No. 841)
(finalized after the 2016 presidential election, but proposed before the election).
16
The New Deal yielded an enormous amount of regulatory legislation, including the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., which is a focus of discussion in this Essay. The latter period includes
a spate of consumer protection and health, safety, and environmental legislation (including the creation
of the EPA and almost all the statutory regimes it administers). One commentator dubbed this latter
regulatory period “the environmental decade.” LETTIE MCSPADDEN WENNER & LAMBERT M. WENNER,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982).
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All of which poses a challenge for regulators and courts. When
conservatives control the executive branch, agencies must answer to political
overseers who profess allegiance to a vision of self-correcting, efficient
markets and of relatively inept or corruptible regulators, a vision fleshed out
by a half-century of public choice scholarship. 17 Given the influence of the
Federalist Society over recent federal judicial appointments, those same
regulators may suspect that that vision will receive an increasingly
sympathetic hearing when an agency’s actions are challenged in court. 18 At
the same time, agencies anticipate that courts will continue to hold them to
statutory obligations designed to protect consumers from the harsher
consequences of free market competition. Because real world markets differ
from textbook markets in important ways, reconciling market competition
with these statutory obligations can be difficult.19 This is a problem that law
and the legal system must resolve, but doing so is difficult because it
implicates the market-versus-regulation dispute that sits on the central fault
line of the modern partisan divide. 20
The overcharge cases present a fundamental challenge to regulators’
authority to balance market competition with their statutory public interest
obligations. The central question in the these cases is whether it is fair and
constitutional for FERC to enforce Federal Power Act prohibitions against
market manipulation against the defendants, 21 given that the trading at issue
violated none of the specific market rules established by the overseers of the
regional electricity market in which the defendants operated—the PJM
market. 22 These cases have drawn public attention and support for the

17

Spence, supra note 8, at 986–95.
David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Courts, WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/02/feature/conquerors-of-the-courts/ (documenting the
Federalist Society’s influence over Trump Administration judicial appointments shepherded through the
Senate by then-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell).
19
For a detailed explanation of the ways in which energy markets depart from textbook markets,
see Spence, supra note 8.
20
See generally NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006) (documenting and measuring the
growing ideological divide over government-market relationships in the United States).
21
For a detailed summary of FERC’s charges in each case, see infra notes 56–68 and
accompanying text.
22
PJM is a voluntary association of utilities in the mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states. Its members
delegate to PJM, which manages the grid and oversees the operation of the wholesale market and within
its members’ territory; as part of that responsibility it establishes the rules market participants must
follow. The acronym “PJM” once represented the three states that comprised the original territory of the
organization: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland. PJM is no longer an acronym representing
anything other than the organization itself.
18
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defendants among economists, in part because FERC’s enforcement posture
challenges the neo-Hayekian 23 faith in the ability of markets to maximize
welfare that has taken root across the ideological right. A decision upholding
FERC’s enforcement posture would represent a defeat for that Hayekian
vision of efficient markets and for the notion that regulatory interventions
almost inevitably reduce efficiency and welfare. A decision overturning
FERC’s decision (or a FERC reversal of its own decision) would represent a
defeat for traditional notion that, irrespective of the extent to which
regulators rely on markets, regulators’ statutory public interest mandate
implies the need to intervene in markets. Therefore, these cases represent a
kind of bellwether for this broader conflict over the proper relationship
between government and markets.
This Essay argues that the fundamental challenge to regulation
represented by defendants’ position in these overcharge cases is misguided,
both legally and philosophically. It is legally misguided because it ignores
established principles of law supporting an agency’s general power to
enforce broad statutory mandates directly, on a case-by-case basis, even
when defendants have complied with more specific market rules. Indeed,
that regulatory prerogative is well established within electricity market
regulation as well. 24 The defense is also philosophically misguided because
it ignores the reasons historically regulated markets were regulated in the
first place: namely, because real world markets often fail to maximize
welfare in the ways textbook markets suggest, and because market failures
are very difficult for regulators to predict ex ante. In the modern world of
light-handed regulation, the central task facing regulatory agencies is to
capture the benefits of competition while steering competition toward public
interest goals. Given the fluidity and complexity of today’s markets, and the
magnitude of the particular changes facing robust, competitive, and
“decarbonizing” electricity markets,25 that task is Herculean: without the
broad authority to use adjudication to enforce public interest mandates, the
task becomes Sisyphean. Therefore, unless and until Congress is willing to
repeal the public interest mandates under which many regulatory agencies
23
Friedrich Hayek was an Austrian economist sometimes credited as the (or a) father of public
choice scholarship. See, e.g., FREDERICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); FREDERICK A.
HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948).
24
See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
25
The process of removing carbon emissions from the electricity sector implicates important
tradeoffs between environmental performance, cost, and energy reliability that have long characterized
the electric grid. Those tradeoffs are beyond the scope of this Essay, but can be understood by browsing
the EnergyTradeoffs.com web site, http://www.energytradeoffs.com.
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operate, the task of reconciling competitive markets with public interest
mandates requires that agencies be able to regulate both the forest and the
trees. That is, it requires that regulators be able to enforce both broad
statutory mandates and specific market rules simultaneously, because in
complex, real world markets the market participants will always be several
steps ahead of specific market rules in ways that defeat important public
interest goals.
I.

THE COMPLEXITY OF COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS

The cases at issue here involve complicated trading strategies worthy of
a Michael Lewis bestseller about Wall Street and are the latest chapter in a
decades-long effort to bring the benefits of competition to energy markets.
That effort was begun by the regulator itself: FERC first experimented with
competition and market pricing 26 in regulated energy markets on a case-bycase basis in the early 1980s. 27 It later broke the monopoly/monopsony
position held by natural gas pipelines in wholesale natural gas markets in
1986 by ordering the pipelines to offer transmission services on an openaccess, common carrier basis. 28 It did the same with the electricity sector a
decade later. 29 Both moves facilitated the transition away from traditional
administrative rate-setting in wholesale energy markets to the sort of market
pricing we see in much of the market today.

26
Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act charge FERC with the task of ensuring that the
price of wholesale power and transmission services in interstate commerce remain at all times “just and
reasonable” and “non-discriminatory.” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (establishing the “just and reasonable” rate
requirement); § 824e(a) (authorizing FERC to take corrective action against discriminatory rates). Prior
to FERC’s embrace of market pricing those mandates were fulfilled mostly by administrative rate setting.
For a description of that form of ratemaking, see JOEL B. EISEN, EMILY HAMMOND, JIM ROSSI, DAVID B.
SPENCE & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS (5th ed., 2019).
27
JAN PAUL ACTON, STANLEY M. BESEN, TOSHI HAYASHI & RAND CORP., REGULATION,
EFFICIENCY, AND COMPETITION IN THE EXCHANGE OF ELECTRICITY: FIRST-YEAR RESULTS FROM THE
FERC BULK POWER MARKET EXPERIMENT 1–3 (1985).
28
Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol; Order Denying Rehearing
and Clarifying Order Nos. 636 and 636-A, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Dec. 8, 1992)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284) (Order No. 636-B) (forcing the unbundling of natural gas sales from
transmission services).
29
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n May 10, 1996) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37, 385) (Order No. 888) (forcing the unbundling of electricity sales from
transmission services).
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Indeed, FERC now oversees active and robust regional wholesale
markets in both gas and electricity. 30 These active wholesale markets cover
most of the country, excluding the Southeast and the Mountain West. 31 In
these markets, electricity retailers acquire the power they need to serve their
customers from wholesalers bidding for their business. FERC delegates
much of the direct market oversight work to so-called regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) or independent system operators (ISOs), utility
membership organizations that do the actual work of keeping the lights on
monitoring wholesale power markets. 32 PJM, in whose market the
overcharge cases arose, is one such RTO.
In competitive energy markets, FERC’s consistent goal throughout 33 has
been to capture the efficiencies of competition and to avoid the inefficiencies
associated with traditional public utility regulation.34 In electricity markets
that task is complicated by constant technological, economic, and political
change, and by the fact that grid-based electric service must be provided
collectively and in real time. Wholesalers cannot direct the electricity they
produce to a specific buyer; rather, as generators dispatch power to the grid
and consumers remove it from the grid, electric current follows the path of

30
For a summary of the competitive wholesale electricity markets under FERC jurisdiction, see
FERC’s wholesale market web page at https://ferc.gov/industries-data/electric/power-sales-and-markets/
rtos-and-isos.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Importantly, support for market competition has been bipartisan at FERC over the last 25 years.
The agency initiated the transition to competition and market pricing absent specific legislative directive
to do so and absent any change in the pricing mandate written into the statute in 1935. Democratic
appointees’ support for market competition may reflect the view that traditional monopoly utilities
represented an obstacle to decarbonization of the electric grid. Obama appointee Jon Wellinghoff
repeatedly extolled the virtues of markets and oversaw the promulgation of rules designed to open
competitive wholesale markets to nontraditional generators such as renewable generation and demand
response resources. See Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 139 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,246, 77 Fed. Reg.
41,481 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n July 13, 2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order No. 764)
(requiring competitive wholesale markets to remove barriers to entry for wind and solar generators);
Demand Response Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 138 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,148, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,657 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order No.
745-B) (requiring competitive wholesale markets to compensate providers of demand response services
at the spot wholesale price).
34
Critiques of traditional regulation focused on the incentive of utilities to over-invest in capital, a
phenomenon labeled the “Averch-Johnson effect,” after its scholarly proponents. See Harvey Averch &
Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052
(1962) (arguing cost-of-service approach leads to overinvestment in capital); see also Leon Courville,
Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53 (1974)
(demonstrating this effect for power plants). Market pricing and competition aimed to eliminate this
perverse incentive.
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least resistance, not any pre-designated “contract path.” 35 And since electric
energy cannot be stored in commercial quantities affordably, the operators
of the grid (utility owners of the wires) must balance production and
consumption almost instantaneously so as to avoid congestion-induced grid
failures (blackouts). 36
Accordingly, the transition to competition in electricity markets has been
a bumpy, iterative process, and FERC has struggled for more than two
decades to erect an institutional structure within which competition can
flourish. The largest bump in the road, but by no means the only one, was
the California electricity crisis of 2000–2001, during which the newly
competitive California wholesale electricity market failed spectacularly.37
Prices spiked to intolerably high levels, customers experienced rolling
blackouts, and one major electric utility filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
after which the governor shut down the competitive market. 38 While that
market was poorly designed 39 and experienced some very bad luck, 40 its
problems were exacerbated by manipulative trading strategies employed by
energy traders. 41 Traders used a series of mostly Enron-devised trading
techniques to extract billions of dollars from California customers, triggering
a mountain of litigation and tens of billions of dollars in penalties and
refunds. 42
Two of the techniques used during the California crisis are relevant to
this discussion: so-called “wash trades” and what might be called “sham

35
For a layperson’s description of the physics of the electric grid, see Jordan Wirfs-Brock & Leigh
Paterson, IE Questions: What Keeps Our Electric Grid Humming?, INSIDE ENERGY (July 10, 2015),
http://insideenergy.org/2015/07/10/ie-questions-what-keeps-our-electric-grid-humming/.
36
Id. The grid operates at a frequency of 60Hz, and balancing supply and demand in real time is
necessary to keep the grid at (or very near) that frequency. Significant departures from that frequency can
cause outages, and loss of service. Id.
37
For an explanation of the crisis, see CONG. BUDGET OFF., CAUSES AND LESSONS OF THE
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS (Sept. 2001), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/107th-congress2001-2002/reports/californiaenergy.pdf.
38
Id.
39
Id. For most of the crisis the California market allowed wholesale prices to move freely while
retail prices were fixed. When supply was tight, demand for power did not change because retail
customers’ prices remained the same even though wholesale prices skyrocketed. Id.
40
Id. California also experienced unusually acute shortages of hydroelectric power due to a drought
in the Pacific Northwest, and of natural gas due to supply interruptions on pipelines. Id.
41
Kathryn Kranhold, Bryan Lee & Mitchell Benson, New Documents Show Enron Trades
Manipulated California Energy Costs, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2002, 3:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB1020718637382274400.
42
Dale Kasler, Court Orders $200 Million in California Energy Crisis Refunds, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Sept. 9, 2016, 11:52 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article100877647.html.
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congestion relief trades.” Wash trades are simultaneous, mirror-image
bilateral trades of equal volumes of energy at equal prices.43 Wash trades
involve no actual exchange of money or energy, but rather paper exchanges
of very large volumes of energy at aberrant prices—prices that often deviate
significantly from the going rates. 44 The purpose of such trades, which make
no economic sense on their own, is often to influence index prices compiled
by companies like Platts and Bloomberg. 45 High volume price-aberrant
trades can move the volume-weighted index price in the desired direction,
thereby increasing the value of derivative contracts the traders hold, the
settlement of which is tied to the index price. 46 Sham congestion relief trades,
as the name implies, involve scheduling future power deliveries with the
intention of causing planners to predict congestion on the grid. 47 If under the
published market rules traders can earn compensation by forgoing those
trades (so as to relieve congestion) before their execution, it makes economic
sense to schedule congestion-inducing trades in order to earn the associated
congestion-relief revenues. Traders could have lost money on these sorts of
transactions if they mistakenly failed to trigger the congestion-relief
opportunity and the underlying transaction entailed a loss, but that risk was
presumably minimal.
FERC recognized the benefits of allowing speculators (non-energy
firms) to participate in energy markets,48 but concluded that these two
trading techniques served no energy market need; rather, each involved
trades created by the traders solely to earn money under rules designed
(poorly, it turned out) to promote market efficiency. 49 FERC ultimately
concluded that both practices were contrary to the Federal Power Act’s

43
See Scott Patterson, Jenny Strasburg & Jamila Trindle ‘Wash Trades’ Scrutinized, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 17, 2013, 9:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873236396045783664914970
70204.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Energy derivatives are merely contracts through which the parties agree to exchange money in
the future depending upon the relationship between the actual future price of energy, and a price or prices
specified in the contract. They are essentially bets on the future price of energy, but they enable the power
plant owner to guarantee a maximum future price for natural gas purchases, and a minimum sale price
for future electricity sales.
47
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Enron’s Many Strands: The Strategies; How Enron Got California to Buy
Power It Didn’t Need, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/08/business/enrons-many-strands-strategies-enron-got-california-buy-power-it-didn-t-need.html.
48
See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN
MARKETS (Mar. 26, 2003), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/FERCPresentationonFinalReportonPrice
ManipulationinWesternMarkets.pdf [hereinafter WESTERN MARKETS INVESTIGATION].
49
Id.
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requirement that rates be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, imposing
hefty fines on traders who used them. 50 In the years after the California crisis,
FERC tried a variety of different ways to disincentivize manipulative
behavior in electricity markets. These experiments included proposing (and
later abandoning) a single, standard market design for all regional wholesale
markets, 51 using different methods of detecting seller market power, 52 and
imposing a series of behavioral rules on market participants, 53 among others.
In 2005, Congress addressed this issue by incorporating into the Federal
Power Act regime the anti-fraud language of the Securities Act of 1934, 54
which prohibits the use of any “manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance.” 55 Subsequent agency prosecutions of market manipulation,
including the ongoing cases discussed here, charge violations of this
requirement.
II. THE OVERCHARGE CASES
The central question in the recent overcharge cases is the following: Can
FERC penalize trading behavior that serves no commercial purpose related
to the purchase, sale, or delivery of energy (or of hedging risk associated
with energy transactions), but was nevertheless incentivized by specific
market rules? At first blush, the cases bear some factual similarities to the
California trading techniques. Both the California market and the PJM
50

Id.
Chris Crosby, FERC Standard Market Design: Restoring Momentum to Deregulation, POWER
GRID INT’L (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.power-grid.com/2002/12/01/ferc-standard-market-designrestoring-momentum-to-deregulation/#gref (describing the later-abandoned standard market design
proposal).
52
David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the
Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 160–61 (2014).
53
Order Amending Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, Investigation of Terms and
Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorizations, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,218, 62,142 (Nov.
17, 2003), reh’g denied, 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,175 (May 19, 2004); Investigation of Terms and Conditions
of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorizations; Order Proposing Revisions to Market-Based Rate
Tariffs and Authorizations, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,484 (Nov. 29, 2005).
54
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
55
Energy Policy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 315, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 717c–1); § 1283, 119 Stat. at 979-80 (codified as amended at 16 USC § 824v). Many of
the techniques traders might use to manipulate energy markets (like wash trades) involve simultaneous
participation in physical markets for energy and energy derivatives markets regulated by the Commodities
Future Trading Commission (CFTC). Since neither agency has jurisdiction over the other’s market, FERC
and CFTC must cooperate in such cases. See Brian Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013). After
the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, CFTC and FERC signed a memorandum of understanding
aimed at coordinating their regulation of energy markets. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, News
Release: FERC Chairman Kelliher and CFTC Chairman Jeffery sign MOU on information sharing,
confidentiality (2005), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2005/2005-4/10-12-05.pdf.
51
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market use a two-stage auction to set spot prices: market participants submit
day-ahead bids (to supply or purchase power, or to provide hedges for energy
firms), which are cleared in the real-time market the next day.56 In the
Powhatan case, a hedge fund trader, Dr. Houlian Chen, found a way to
exploit rules published by the PJM wholesale power market that reimburse
market participants for overcharges associated with so-called “line losses”
(energy lost during transmission). 57 The trading involved bets on prices at
different nodes (locations) on the PJM grid at different stages of the PJM
auction; traders expected congestion to influence those prices. 58 Chen
discovered that by scheduling large volumes of mirror image trades
(resembling wash trades) across the two stages of the PJM auction, he could
qualify for compensation under the PJM line loss reimbursement scheme,
and did so, earning large profits in a relatively short period of time. 59 FERC
subsequently charged Chen with violating the anti-manipulation provisions
of the Federal Power Act and imposed a $30 million fine, representing
disgorgement of profits plus penalties. 60 The other two overcharge cases,
City Power Marketing and Coaltrain Energy, involved the use of the very
same techniques to exploit the very same PJM rule.61 The defendants in these
cases are at loggerheads with FERC over whether the mirror image trading
56
PJM INTERCONNECTION L.L.C., Energy Market, https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/
energy.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
57
FERC v. Powhatan Energy Fund, L.L.C., 949 F.3d 891, 895–96 (4th Cir. 2018). In PJM’s view,
overcharges were necessary to send efficient market signals to buyers and sellers of power, necessitating
the need for reimbursement method after the fact. Id.
58
Spot prices for wholesale power on the PJM grid are set by the competitive market: that is, buy
bids submitted by buyers and sellers of wholesale power. But buyers and sellers need access to the
transmission grid to consummate their deals, and transmission services are not competitively priced.
PJM’s spot power prices reflect not only the cost of supplying power to a node, but also congestion costs,
so as to dissuade market participants from scheduling transactions over congested lines. PJM
INTERCONNECTION L.L.C., Market for Electricity, https://learn.pjm.com/electricity-basics/market-forelectricity.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
59
Chen’s trades involved a PJM product called “up to congestion” price, which is a virtual
product—that is, a derivative. They did not involve the purchase or sale of actual power. Because these
instruments are derivatives, one might expect CFTC to have exclusive jurisdiction over them. Hunter v.
FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013). However, CFTC has exempted these and other transmission
derivatives from its regulatory jurisdiction because of their close connection to FERC-jurisdictional
power markets. Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and
Regional Transmission Organizations to Exempt Specified Transactions Authorized by a Tariff or
Protocol Approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Public Utility Commission of
Texas From Certain Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act Pursuant to the Authority Provided in
the Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,879 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Apr. 2, 2013).
60
Complaint at 4–5, FERC v. Powhatan Energy Fund, L.L.C., No. 3:15-CV-00452 (E.D. Va. July
31, 2015).
61
FERC v. City Power Mktg., No. 1:15-cv-01428 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2015); FERC v. Coaltrain
Energy L.P., No. 2:16-cv-00732 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2016).
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strategy at issue, once perfected, posed a real risk of loss for the traders; in
any case, defendants dispute FERC’s characterization of these trades as wash
trades. 62 More importantly, defendants contend that (i) because no specific
PJM market rule prohibited the trades at the time they were made, it is
statutorily and constitutionally unfair to penalize the trading; and (ii) the
trades lack the element of fraud and deception required to prove
manipulation claims under the statute. 63 Each of the three defendants has
sought judicial review of FERC enforcement actions in federal court. All
three proceedings survived motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. Since
their inception the cases have been embroiled in years of litigation over
defendant Powhatan’s demand for a trial de novo on the merits, such that the
underlying merits of the cases have yet to be addressed by the court.64
The defendants contend that even if the mirror image trading strategy at
issue in the overcharge cases does not serve any energy market need, it serves
another important policy purpose: to expose poorly designed market rules,
in much the same way a hacker exposes the vulnerability of computer
security systems. 65 To punish traders like Chen for exploiting flaws in the
market design, they say, is to impede the development of better market rules
by dissuading discovery of those flaws (via their exploitation). 66
Furthermore, Powhatan’s filings and public statements reflect a kind of
incredulity about FERC’s rejection of this argument, calling the FERC staff
report on which the charges are based as a “gotcha narrative” that is “so offbase” that “the Staff simply cannot be reasoned with here.”67 Powhatan
describes “finding loopholes” as “a time honored American tradition,” 68 and
charges FERC with government overreach and a misunderstanding of how
markets work. 69
62

Motion to Dismiss at 5, FERC v. Coaltrain Energy, L.P., No. 2:16-cv-00732 (S.D. Ohio July 27,

2016).
63

Id. at 30–34.
The cases have been bogged down for years in a separate procedural dispute about de novo
judicial review of FERC decisions. Those procedural disputes have prevented judicial review of the
merits of the cases to date. For the procedural posture of this case as of this writing, see Joint Notice of
Procedural Status, FERC v. Powhatan Energy Fund, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 751, No. 3:15-cv-00452 (E.D.
Va. 2017), http://ferclitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/Joint-Notice-of-Procedural-Status-05-08-20.pdf.
65
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 62.
66
Id.; Response to Order to Show Cause at 4–5, Powhatan Energy Fund LLC, No. IN15-3-000
(Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Feb. 2, 2015).
67
Response to Order to Show Cause at 1, 4, Powhatan Energy Fund LLC, No. IN15-3-000 (Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm’n Feb. 2, 2015).
68
Id. at 4–5.
69
Defendants’ argument is eerily reminiscent of the fictional Wall Street icon Gordon Gekko, from
Oliver Stone’s 1987 film “Wall Street.” The most oft-quoted line from the movie is “Greed . . . is good.
64
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These statements reflect a view of markets as a kind of maximization
game played according to a system of clear, well-defined rules in which
behaviors that are not specifically prohibited by the rules must be permitted.
The players (traders) can be expected to do their very best (to make as much
money as they can) within the letter of the rules. According to this view,
Chen was only doing his job; it is up to the designers of market rules to steer
his maximizing behavior in more productive directions. After he revealed
the flaw in the rules, regulators were able to close that loophole—a favor
they returned not with gratitude, but with punishment. Beneath this marketsas-maximization-game idea is a broader, more philosophical claim about
economic freedom and how to maximize social welfare: one reminiscent of
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, 70 Milton Friedman’s admonition that the only
“social responsibility of business . . . [is] to increase its profits . . . within the
rules of the game,” 71 and Friedrich Hayek’s expectation that markets best
maximize social welfare on their own through a process he called
“spontaneous order.” 72
Perhaps because the overcharge cases make such a basic claim about the
relationship between government and markets, they have periodically
attracted the attention of a roster of eminent electricity and financial market
experts, many retained by defendant Powhatan. 73 Many of these experts have
Greed is right. Greed works.” WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). But the Gekko character also
makes the case for greed in ways that foreshadow the defendants in the overcharge cases:
This is America. And there is nothing wrong with [exploiting a loophole] even if the person
exploiting the loophole may think that the market would probably be better off as a whole without
the existence of the loophole. . . . Traders do not make the rules; they merely follow them. They
obviously have no obligation to forego profit opportunities just because the rule makers
promulgated some rules that arguably should be changed. . . . [T]raders who aggressively exploit
loopholes do both the market and the rule makers a service by highlighting the inefficiency of the
rules, thereby leading the rule makers to fix whatever problem may exist.

Id. For a fuller account of the growing popularity of the Gekko philosophy on Wall Street after the release
of the movie, see Michael Lewis, Greed Never Left, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.
com/hollywood/2010/04/wall-street-201004.
70
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 349 (1804).
71
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 ( 1962).
72
David Rehr, Hayek’s Legacy of Spontaneous Order, FED. RSRV. BANK MINNEAPOLIS POL’Y
PAPERS
(1992),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3747
(discussing Hayek’s notion of “spontaneous order” as the further development of Adam Smith’s
“invisible hand” idea).
73
That list has changed over time as experts have been added and subtracted from the litigation.
As of this writing, however, it includes Harvard Kennedy School professor William Hogan, who is
perhaps the leading academic advisor to designers and regulators of competitive electricity markets, and
Craig Pirrong, who has written extensively about the manipulation of commodities markets. For the full
current list of experts Powhatan has enlisted to its cause, and their respective biographies, see FERC V.

SPENCE_1.25.21

28

1/25/2021 9:24 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 70

lined up in opposition to FERC’s enforcement position, supporting the
mechanical view of markets and limited role for regulators advanced by the
Powhatan defense. That is worrying, because neither the legal nor the
philosophical case for Powhatan’s position is persuasive. To the contrary,
Powhatan’s legal arguments ignore precedents generally supporting an
agency’s right to use adjudication to enforce its statutory public interest
obligations directly, and FERC’s particular history of treating trades that
intentionally undermine market efficiency as manipulative. Furthermore, the
philosophical proposition that the invisible hand will maximize social
welfare in electricity markets is also disputable. Like many historically
regulated markets, electricity markets depart from textbook markets in
systematic and predictable ways that demand both regulatory attention and
regulatory flexibility if the agency is to fulfill its public interest obligation—
in this case, to ensure that market rates remain just and reasonable.
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES: MANIPULATION AND FAIRNESS
At the heart of the defense in the overcharge cases is the proposition that
open, undisguised trading behavior that abides by specific market rules
cannot be manipulative because (i) behavior that is not prohibited by specific
market rules is, by definition, legal; and (ii) such behavior lacks the element
of fraud necessary to support a manipulation claim. Moreover, to impose
liability in that case would violate defendants’ (fairness and due process)
rights to prior notice that its conduct was illegal. This Part addresses each of
these claims in turn.
A. What Is “Manipulation”?
FERC and the defendants agree that not all financial trading (speculation)
in energy markets constitutes manipulation. To the contrary, traders from
hedge funds and other financial institutions serve important and underappreciated functions in energy markets, in particular by providing
counterparties for energy firms looking to hedge price risk. For example, a
power plant owner seeking to lock in a future price at which to buy natural
gas may have a difficult time finding a willing counterparty among natural
gas producers and marketers. Traders from financial institutions may have
different views about the future of the market than traders representing
energy firms, or they may have a greater appetite for financial risk. For either
POWHATAN ENERGY FUND, LLC, Independent Experts, http://ferclitigation.com/team-members/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2021).
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or both of those reasons, financial institutions may be willing to sell energy
derivatives that meet a firm’s needs when other energy firms will not. In that
way banks and hedge funds provide liquidity in energy derivative markets,
and help energy firms reduce price risk. 74 Financial traders undertake risks
in doing so: they sometimes make mistaken bets on the future direction of
prices, and lose money in the process. Their presence is particularly helpful
in two-stage auction markets like those common in spot markets for
electricity, including PJM’s, at least theoretically. In these two-stage
markets, competition from financial traders theoretically impedes the ability
of pivotal suppliers to exercise market power and promotes price
convergence by identifying arbitrage opportunities in the market, though
some scholarship challenges that conclusion. 75 FERC and the defendants
disagree, however, over whether speculation can ever be manipulative if it is
undertaken openly and in compliance with published market rules.
The underlying trades that qualified Chen and other traders for line loss
reimbursement—bets on the spot price of electricity at either end of
potentially congested transmission line segments—may have posed a risk of
loss for the traders under a low-probability set of circumstances. But even if
it did, it does not necessarily follow that those trades were therefore not
manipulative trades under the Federal Power Act. The congestion relief
trading strategies employed by Enron during the California electricity crisis
also entailed a risk of loss for the traders, yet FERC deemed them
manipulative at the time. 76 Indeed, many of the trading techniques covered
by the anti-manipulation language of the Federal Power Act (and the
Commodities Exchange Act) entail the risk of loss: trades undertaken with
the full expectation that the trader will lose money in one market, but with
the simultaneous hope and expectation that she will recover those losses and
additional profits in another market. 77 Traders undertake uneconomic trades
in physical markets to influence the closing price of a product, thereby
making their derivative contracts—which are essentially bets on that
74

Response to Order to Show Cause, supra note 66, at 5–6.
See, e.g., Ruoyang Li, Alva J. Svoboda & Shmuel S. Oren, Efficiency Impact of Convergence
Bidding on the California Electricity Market, 48 J. REG. ECON. 245, 247 (2015); John Birge, Ali Hortaçsu,
Ignacia Mercadal & Michael Pavlin, Limits to Arbitrage in Electricity Markets 1 (MIT Ctr. for Energy &
Env’t Pol’y Rsch., Working Paper No. 2017-003, 2017), http://ceepr.mit.edu/files/papers/2017-003.pdf.
76
FERC, Staff White Paper on Anti-Market Manipulation Enforcement Efforts Ten Years After
EPACT 2005, at 23–24 (Nov. 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/
marketmanipulationwhitepaper.pdf. Traders looking to be paid to relieve congestion risked losses if their
anticipation of receiving compensation for congestion relief was not realized (that is, if they guessed
wrong and scheduled transactions over uncongested lines) and those transactions risked losses.
77
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824v; Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b–c.
75
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physical market price—more valuable. Many FERC and CFTC prosecutions
involve exactly this type of cross-market activity. 78
Shortly after Congress added its anti-manipulation language to the
Federal Power Act in 2005, FERC issued its Order 670, 79 making it illegal
to “use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” and to engage
in “any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any entity” in connection with the purchase or sale of
energy subject to FERC’s jurisdiction. 80 This language was borrowed from
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 81 and FERC
indicated that it would incorporate case law interpreting securities law
jurisprudence into its understanding of Order 670, where appropriate and
relevant. 82 At the time FERC stated its belief that the statutory amendments
and Order 670 would have covered most of the forms of anticompetitive
conduct witnessed in the California markets, including the use of wash trades
and the artificial creation and relief of transmission congestion.83
The focus on fraud in the regulatory language, however, invites the
inference that conduct must be deceptive in order to be manipulative. Indeed,
most cases charging manipulation of securities markets involve deception, 84
and there is even some securities law precedent supporting the notion that
open market activity (involving no deception) cannot be “manipulative.” 85
Traders like Chen did not conceal their activity from regulators or from
market overseers. In that sense, their conduct was not deceptive or
fraudulent. On the other hand, the trades served no purpose related to the
proper functioning of energy markets (other than to show how those markets
could be exploited). 86 These trades did not facilitate the purchase, sale, or
78
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, Karen
Levine & Ryan Smith, No. IN08-8-000, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041 (July 16, 2013) (imposing a fine on Barclays
for uneconomic trades in the physical market for electricity in California to improve the value of
derivatives Barclays held); see also WESTERN MARKETS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48.
79
Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,244–45 (Jan. 26, 2006) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1) (Order No. 670) [hereinafter FERC Order 670].
80
18 CFR § 1c.2(3) (2006).
81
17 CFR § 240.10b-5(c) (2005).
82
See FERC Order 670, supra note 79.
83
See id. at 4,254.
84
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (defining “manipulative” as “virtually
a term of art when used in connection with securities markets” that “connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors”); see also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472
U.S. 1, 6 (1985); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
85
GFL Advantage Fund Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2001).
86
To be precise, the trades show how the specific market rules could be exploited if regulators lack
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delivery of energy, nor did they provide counterparties for energy companies
looking to hedge risk. Rather, each trade was scheduled solely for the
purpose of qualifying for overcharge refunds under the PJM market rules. In
that sense, the underlying trades were a fiction, and therefore (at least,
arguably) deceptive.
Moreover, despite the focus on deception in the securities case law, the
relevant language in both the securities and electricity statutes prohibits
“manipulative or deceptive devices,” 87 language that clearly implies that a
trading technique may be manipulative without being deceptive.88 If that
were not the case, then a firm that openly corners a market would be free to
set its own price unless and until new entrants were able to undercut that
price. Thus, FERC’s contention that the trades at issue here are manipulative
is not undercut by the conclusion that they were not deceptive. 89
Nevertheless, courts have yet to address directly whether deceit is an
essential element of an anti-manipulation claim under the Federal Power Act.
Given the conflicting precedent, the resolution of that legal issue in these
cases is uncertain.
The same cannot be said, however, for the defendants’ claim that FERC’s
direct enforcement of the statute violates defendants’ due process right to
notice of the illegality of its behavior.
B. The Right to Prior Notice
Powhatan argues it had no prior notice of the illegality of its trading
behavior because it was not specifically prohibited by (PJM) market rules,
and FERC therefore erred by applying the statutory prohibition against
manipulation to that behavior. In so doing, Powhatan argues, FERC violated
Powhatan’s constitutional right to prior notice under the Due Process Clause.
the power to enforce the broader statutory prohibition against market participants who follow the specific
market rules.
87
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 315, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2006); id. at § 1283, 119 Stat. at 979–80.
88
Steve Thel has built a strong case in support of a this view in the securities context, concluding
from the legislative history of the securities acts that “[t]he SEC’s authority to regulate the use of
manipulative devices and contrivances under section 10(b) extends to all practices that contribute to
disorder in the market or that give voice to speculative sentiment there.” Steve Thel, Regulation of
Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359 (1988); see also Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of
Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1994).
89
For a summary of the case law on the legality of openly manipulative trading behavior under the
securities acts’ “fraud” standard, see Spence & Prentice, supra note 52, at 180–88.
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Of course, the Due Process Clause does impose prior notice requirements
and limits on the retroactive imposition of criminal liability, 90 and imposes
lesser, similar limits on administrative agencies’ civil enforcement of
statutory mandates. 91 However, as described in the previous section, there is
a strong argument that the overcharge case defendants had (at least
constructive) notice that FERC considered the kind of trading in which they
engaged to be manipulative.
The defendants contend that by failing to prohibit their trading strategy,
the specific PJM market rules effectively authorized it.92 However, courts
have long been clear that statutory standards and mandates can have
independent legal force apart from (and beyond the scope of) individual rules
enacted by regulators to guide their enforcement. Indeed, neither wash
trading nor the congestion-relief strategies employed by Enron during the
California crisis were specifically prohibited by California market rules at
the time. 93 Yet both FERC and the courts concluded that the language of the
Federal Power Act and associated regulations prohibited those trades.94 If
FERC is correct that Congress intended for the anti-manipulation language
in the 2005 amendments to cover those behaviors, neither the presence of
risk in a trading strategy nor its openness necessarily contradicts the
conclusion that the trades were manipulative. Thus, the regulator’s authority
to enforce statutory mandates need not be defined exclusively by the
agency’s own rules; it can flow directly from the statute as well.
The idea that an agency’s public interest obligations may entail the direct
enforcement of broad statutory prohibitions against defendants—even when
defendants have complied with more specific rules governing their
conduct—is a long-standing principle governing the application of anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws, from which the Federal Power Act’s antimanipulation provisions are drawn. In United States v. Simon, the Second
90
Criminal statutes can be void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause. See Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
91
See General Electric Corp. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that
because “[d]ue process requires that parties receive fair notice before being deprived of property,” the
Environmental Protection Agency could not penalize General Electric for asserted regulatory violations
when General Electric lacked “fair warning of [EPA’s] interpretation of the regulations”); see also Shell
Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that because the U.S. Department of
Interior’s change in the way it calculated offshore oil leases constituted a change in a longstanding
interpretation of the Department’s existing rules, the new policy required notice and comment).
92
See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss, supra note 62, at 5.
93
WESTERN MARKETS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48.
94
Order Approving Settlement Agreements with Conditions, 155 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,376, 62,142 (June
28, 2006).
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Circuit upheld a criminal prosecution of auditors for violating the applicable
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1934 even though the auditors
had complied literally with all applicable Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS)
rules in their preparation of the audit report in question. 95 The court inferred
from the statutory prohibition against fraud a general duty of auditors not to
submit misleading reports of the audited company’s financial health
irrespective of any additional duty to comply with more specific GAAP and
GAAS rules. 96 Interestingly, the Simon principle loomed large as Congress
crafted the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the wake of the Enron accounting
scandal of the early 2000s. 97 Because traders are less likely to be aware of
statutory standards than specific market rules, the Simon principle offends
not only the defendants in the overcharge cases, it also offends the sense of
fairness of some conservatives in Congress. 98 Nevertheless, courts continue
to follow the Simon rule, 99 and it has been applied to prosecutions under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act 100—the specific section on which the antifraud provisions of the Federal Power Act are based.
Powhatan claims further that because “[n]o PJM tariff provision and no
[prior] Commission order ever alerted Powhatan that the trading at issue
could be unlawful,” 101 FERC’s enforcement action violates its constitutional
right to prior notice of the illegality of the trades at issue. Putting aside the
question of whether prior FERC orders provided Powhatan notice of the
illegality of their trades, the Simon line of cases suggests that the statutory
mandate against manipulation provided defendants with constructive notice.
95

United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 594 (1970).
Id. at 805–06.
97
S. REP. NO. 107-75, at 57 (2002) (citing Simon, 425 F.2d 796) (stating that auditors should ensure
that companies follow accounting standards).
98
Floyd Norris, An Old Case is Returning to Haunt Auditors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/01/business/an-old-case-is-returning-to-haunt-auditors.html (quoting
Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-FL), who said he is “troubled” by the idea that one could violate the law while
complying with GAAP, and calling the standard “burdensome”).
99
See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a challenge to a jury
instruction based on its failure to allege violation of GAAP rules); United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208,
220 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting defendants’ argument that Simon applies “only to cases where no specific
accounting provision speaks to the alleged accounting malfeasance”); SEC v. Seghers, 298 Fed. Appx.
319, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (“GAAP violations are neither necessary nor sufficient to prove securities
fraud.”); Vista Outdoor Inc. v. Reeves Fam. Tr., 234 F. Supp. 3d 558, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (concluding
that defendants “conflate GAAP with the distinct issue of whether the defendants acted in bad faith”).
100
See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev’d in part on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 460 F.
Supp. 729, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
101
Response to Order to Show Cause, supra note 66, at 8.
96
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Moreover, the notion that agencies retain the kind of enforcement flexibility
to which Powhatan objects gets further support from the familiar Chenery
principle, which establishes that regulators are free to articulate the policies
that form the basis of their decisions on a case-by-case basis, within the
context of administrative adjudications.102 Of course, Chenery did not
dispense with constitutional notice requirements, but rather suggested that
those requirements can be satisfied by methods other than application of
previously published rules. 103 Indeed, it specifically endorsed the SEC’s
announcement and simultaneous application of a new policy, based upon the
agency’s duty to be faithful to the statutory design. 104 In other words, if the
policy is implied by the statutory design, the agency can announce it and
apply it simultaneously.
The Chenery principle applies in a wide variety of administrative
adjudications. 105 Nevertheless, the problem of ensuring that the defendant
has prior notice of the agency policy seems especially acute in the context of
administrative enforcement actions. Indeed, this concern motivated Justice
Jackson’s dissent in Chenery, 106 and has attracted some scholarly
commentary as well. 107 However, there is nothing in the critique of the
Chenery majority to suggest that FERC’s enforcement posture in the
overcharge cases violates constitutional notice requirements. The defendants
in the overcharge cases ought not to have been misled by the PJM rules, just
as Enron and others could not argue persuasively that they were misled by
GAAP rules during the financial crisis of 2001. In the words of the Fifth
Circuit, “it is possible to violate GAAP, yet not commit fraud, and it is

102
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (finding that regulatory agencies may craft
policy on a case-by-case basis through adjudication and are not obligated to use rulemaking to create
policy).
103
Id. at 199–200. For an argument that the Chenery rule trumps the General Electric rule as long
as the agency is not applying “quasi-criminal” sanctions for violating the new interpretation, see Harold
J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV 1187, 1222–23 n.202 (1997).
104
Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
105
See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 49, 54 (2005) (“Chenery II dispelled the notion that . . . an agency (where the standard
is unclear) . . . [must] make a general rule before proceeding through case-by-case enforcement
adjudications.”).
106
Chenery, 332 U.S. at 210 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion “makes
judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality”).
107
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the Limitation
of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 355 (2000) (detailing the ways lower courts have cabined the
discretion conferred in Chenery).
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possible to commit fraud without violating GAAP.” 108 Similarly, it is
possible to manipulate electricity markets in contravention of the Federal
Power Act without violating PJM market rules. Accordingly, defendants had
constructive notice that FERC would punish the kind of trading in which
they engaged.
In sum, Simon and Chenery clearly demonstrate that one can violate a
broad statutory prohibition without violating specific rules enacted under
that same statutory prohibition. This principle is important to the
management of volatile electricity markets, and more broadly to the use of
competition and market pricing as a regulatory option. Ever since the
California electricity crisis, FERC has consistently embraced both
competition and market pricing on the one hand, and the prohibition (as
manipulative) and punishment of trading behavior that serves no legitimate
market purpose, on the other. 109 Given the complexity and fluidity of
electricity markets—and their particular susceptibility to the exercise of
market power—this approach makes sense. Neither the Constitution nor
principles of basic fairness suggest that regulators must ignore the forest for
the trees.
IV. REGULATION AND MARKETS: A QUESTION OF FAITH
FERC’s enforcement posture in the overcharge cases is a natural
outgrowth of the statutory public interest mandates that animated public
utility regulation in the first place 110 and the longstanding principle that
regulators’ statutory duty to protect the public interest requires more than
mere passive arbitration of private disputes. 111 That this approach now

108
SEC v. Seghers, 298 Fed. Appx 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d
208, 220 (2d Cir. 2007)); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2006).
109
See, e.g., High Desert Power Project, Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, No.
IN20-6-000, 173 FERC ¶ 61,087 (2020) (approving settlement and imposing penalty for electricity
market bidding behavior that took advantage of a software error to trigger compensation to the bidder,
without serving any legitimate market purpose); Barclays Bank, Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement, No. IN08-8-000, 161 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,147 (2017) (settlement of enforcement action
charging Barclays with manipulation in connection with loss-generating trades of electricity markets in
order to generate increased value of derivatives held by Barclays); J.P. Morgan, Order Approving
Stipulation and Consent Agreement, Nos. IN11-8-000 & IN13-5-000, 144 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,068 (2013)
(settlement of enforcement action charging J.P. Morgan with manipulation in connection with bidding
strategies that in electricity markets).
110
See generally Boyd, supra note 6; William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 765 (2008).
111
See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d. 608, 620 (1965) (stating that
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attracts such vigorous opposition in the overcharge cases is emblematic of a
more fundamental divide at the heart of regulatory policy—one that can be
stated in the form of a question. Which is the more misplaced faith: faith in
the ability of free markets to maximize social net benefits, or faith in
government to maximize social net benefits by intervening in response to
market failure? As financial institutions have come to play a more central
role in energy markets, these two world views will clash more often because
the Smithian ideal of the invisible hand and the Hayekian ideal of selforganizing markets have many adherents in the world of finance. 112 It also
seems to dovetail with Republican hostility to the administrative state. 113
This clash of perspectives is not limited to electricity markets. Recent and
ongoing policy disputes over net neutrality, 114 repeal and replacement of the
Affordable Care Act, 115 congressional Republicans’ proposals to privatize
Social Security and Medicare, 116 and the Trump Administration’s repeal of
“job-killing” environmental rules are justified by the assertion that
unregulated markets can deliver better results than regulated markets. 117 As
support for bolder and more aggressive policy interventions grows among
the ranks of progressive and Democratic politicians, these worldviews will

the Commission’s public interest role “does not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and
strikes for adversaries appearing before it” but rather “the public must receive active and affirmative
protection at the hands of the Commission”).
112
Cf. Lewis, supra note 69.
113
See David Spence, The Founders Might Actually Have Liked the ‘Deep State’, WASH. POST
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-founders-might-actually-have-liked-thedeep-state/2017/03/15/0b8951ca-08e0-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html.
114
In 2016, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Obama-era Federal Communication Commission’s rule on
net neutrality in U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In 2018, the Trump
Administration’s FCC repealed the rule. Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7,852 (codified at 47
C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20). This rule was then reversed in part by the D.C. Circuit. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Following this ruling, the FCC issued an order on remand addressing the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion. Order on Remand, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, Bridging the Digital
Divide for Low-Income Consumers, Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Nos. 17-108, 17287, 11-42, FCC 20-151 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Oct. 29, 2020).
115
The Affordable Care Act actually refers to two separate pieces of legislation—the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered titles of the U.S.C.) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
116
Congressional Republicans’ antipathy to the legislation, which they call “socialism,” has been
well documented. See, e.g., Michael McAuliff, House Passes 56th Anti-Obamacare Measure,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/03/repeal-obamacare_n_
6607080.html.
117
The list of environmental rules repealed by the Trump EPA is long. The Harvard Energy &
Environmental Law Program maintains a list of those repealed rules. ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY LAW
PROGRAM, Regulatory Rollback Tracker, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2021).
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clash more frequently, sharply, and openly than they do in the relatively
obscure dispute represented by the overcharge cases.
But “market-versus-regulation” is a false choice. The real question is one
of degree, as evidenced by two obvious truths: (i) competitive wholesale
electricity markets were created by federal regulators, most of whom have
embraced the benefits of competition; 118 and (ii) regulation (enforceable
legal rules) are a predicate to the very existence of markets and their efficient
operation. 119 This may be one reason why the evangelists of each faith are
sometimes tempted to offer up idealized versions of their preferred method
of social organization (markets or policies) for comparisons against real
world, warts-and-all versions of their disfavored method. 120 Indeed, as with
religious faiths, the zeal of the disciples often exceeds that of the founders.
Both Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek recognized a role for government to
provide “intelligently designed and continuously adjusted legal
institutions” 121 to ensure markets work efficiently—that is, to address public
goods and externality problems, and to incentivize investment where
markets fail to supply enough of a good that society needs. 122 Neither Smith
nor Hayek subscribed to blunt condemnations of “government qua
government” or “regulation qua regulation.” Rather, Smith and Hayek
condemned the particular types of authoritarian market interventions they
118

See supra Part I.
It is axiomatic that the ability to enforce property rights and contracts facilitates investment and
gains from trade, and that nongovernmental enforcement regimes that exist tend to be ad hoc and local.
Broad regional markets require regulation.
120
See Boyd, supra note 110, at 1657 (“[C]omparing an ideal view of markets to real-world
regulation was never going to go in regulation’s favor and . . . there were plenty of problems with existing
practices of utility regulation to provide fodder for . . . critics.”); see also Spence, supra note 8 (detailing
the various ways in which public choice scholars’ idealized view of markets depart from real-world
energy markets).
121
HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 23, at 29.
122
Here is Hayek (quoting Smith) on the importance of “intelligently designed and continuously
adjusted” legal institutions in an efficient market:
119

To create conditions in which competition will be as effective as possible, to supplement it where
it cannot be made effective, to provide the services which, in the words of Adam Smith, “though
they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however of such a nature,
that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals” –
these tasks provide, indeed a wide and unquestioned field for state activity. In no system that
could be rationally defended with the state just do nothing. An effective competitive system needs
an intelligently designed and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other. Even
the most essential prerequisite of its proper functioning, the prevention of fraud and deception
(including exploitation of ignorance), provides a great and by no means yet fully accomplished
object of legislative activity.

Id. (emphasis added).
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witnessed at the time they wrote (for Smith, collusive power of guilds; for
Hayek, centrally planned fascism and communism). 123 It is a sizeable leap
from Smith’s and Hayek’s criticisms of those sorts of government
interventions to the idealized vision of free markets governed not by general
standards, but only by specific mechanical rules prescribed in advance
offered by the defendants in the overcharge cases.124
As markets become more fluid and complex, the need for regulatory
flexibility grows. Ever since Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan’s
remark in anticipation of the continued “irrational exuberance” behind
financial market bubbles in the twenty-first century, 125 it has been fairly
obvious that faith in the efficiency of financial markets is often misplaced.
Price does not always transmit information to financial markets fully or
accurately. The same is true of electricity markets, which have struggled to
emulate textbook markets over the last two decades in ways their designers
had hoped. Indeed, the twenty-five-year history of competition and market
pricing in electricity markets is one of constant tinkering with the market
rules to deter the exercise of market power, incentivize investment in
electricity supply and transmission, and push economic actors’ behaviors in
socially-desirable directions. This process of learning and iterative
experimentation is continuous and necessary.
Consider, for example, the California crisis and its aftermath. 126 The
crisis precipitated a long search by FERC for ways to prevent sellers in
wholesale markets for electricity from capturing monopoly rents by
acquiring market power—the very thing the original public utility statutes
were enacted to prevent.127 The process of investigating that breakdown
produced lessons, beyond those aimed at the manipulative trading techniques
used by Enron and others. In textbook markets, high prices beget rapid
reductions in demand and increases in supply. But in California, there was
no reactive reduction in demand because the retail rates consumers paid were

123

Id.; SMITH, supra note 70.
The late Judge Richard Cudahy, perhaps the foremost expert on energy markets on the federal
bench during his lifetime, expressed deep skepticism to this idealized vision, characterizing it as
“folklore.” Richard D. Cudahy, The Folklore of Deregulation (with Apologies to Thurman Arnold), 15
YALE J. REG. 427, 427 (1998).
125
See Alan Greenspan, Chairperson, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the
Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
(Dec. 5, 1996).
126
The facts of the crisis are recounted briefly at supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
127
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
124
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fixed: they remained unchanged even as wholesale prices skyrocketed. 128
Consequently, finding ways to incentivize demand responsive behavior has
been a focus of considerable academic and regulatory attention in the years
since, producing new ways of pricing power at retail 129 and changes to
wholesale market rules to compensate providers of demand reduction during
periods of scarcity, 130 to name just two examples.
Nor did the supply side of the market react as textbook markets do. In the
electricity generation sector, market entry is neither costless nor quick.
Consequently, different ISOs/RTOs employ different bidding and pricing
rules in spot markets to try to address (and prevent) the problem of supply
scarcity. Many rely on either state utility regulation or “capacity markets” to
provide revenue guarantees to providers of reserve generating capacity; 131
some market overseers worry about buyer-side market power in these
capacity markets and tinker with capacity market institutions to mitigate that
power. 132 Other RTOs/ISOs rely on scarcity pricing to incentivize
investment in reserve generation 133 to enter into ad hoc contractual
arrangements with owners of individual plants to make sure that they will be
available to supply power when called upon, 134 or to discourage the closure

128

See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 37.
For a review of these efforts, see Ahmad Faruqui & Jennifer Palmer, Dynamic Pricing and Its
Discontents, 34 REG. 16 (2011); Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity,
102 AM. ECON. REV. 381 (2012).
130
For a review of programs aimed at compensating these kinds of “demand response” services,
and the FERC rules that encourage them, see Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations:
Market Pathways and Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351 (2017).
131
For a critical analysis of capacity markets, see Joshua C. Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Rate
Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2020).
132
FERC worries that utilities and other large retailers will exercise market power on the buyer side
of capacity markets and has created controversy in its oversight of measures to mitigate that risk in the
PJM and New York regional markets. See, e.g., Paul Ciampoli, FERC Acts on NYISO Buyer-Side Market
Power Mitigation Rules in Series of Orders, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.
publicpower.org/periodical/article/ferc-acts-nyiso-buyer-side-market-power-mitigation-rules-seriesorders; MOPR Migration: Implications of FERC’s PJM Capacity Market Order in the New York and
New England Electricity Markets, KIRKLAND & ELLIS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.kirkland.com//media/publications/blog-post/2020/02/mopr-migration-implications-of-fercs-pjm-capacity.pdf.
133
The Texas market has eschewed capacity markets in favor of incentivizing investment in reserve
generation by letting wholesale electricity prices move as high as $9,000/MWh when supplies are scarce.
See Joshua Rhodes, Summer Price Spikes Are a Feature of Texas’ Power Market, Not a Bug, AXIOS
(Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.axios.com/summer-price-spikes-are-a-feature-of-texas-power-market-nota-bug-29638cbc-524c-4ff0-8604-9414a22fe89b.html.
134
These ad hoc agreements are traditionally referred to as “reliability must run” or “RMR”
agreements. See, e.g., Robert Walton, FERC Approves California Reliability-Must-Run Contracts,
UTILITY DIVE (May 3, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-approves-california-reliabilitymust-run-contracts/522679/.
129
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of the plant. 135 No wholesale market overseers trust the price signal alone to
ensure long-term efficiency. They fear a shortage and a massive market
power-driven transfer of wealth from customers to sellers as in the California
crisis. So they experiment and tinker with market rules to nudge the market
toward welfare maximizing outcomes. These are regulatory experiments that
may never be completed. Over time, some of what seems to work in one
market will be adopted in others; what doesn’t work will be discarded.
These are but a few illustrative examples of the myriad challenges FERC
faces in its efforts to steer energy markets toward socially productive ends:
that is, to execute its statutory responsibilities to ensure that (i) electricity
prices remain just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 136 across hundreds of
pricing nodes in tens of sub-regional wholesale markets; and (ii) no market
participants are manipulating prices in those markets. The task of steering
electricity markets toward socially productive ends will only grow more
complex and difficult as policy and technological change 137 push a
transformation of the grid away from fossil fuels and toward heavier reliance
on intermittent wind and solar generation, and toward integration of
distributed energy resources like rooftop solar and battery storage. 138
135
These kinds of agreements can be controversial because ratepayers pay for the costs of keeping
the plant on the grid. See Gavin Bade, FERC Approves Cost Recovery for Exelon’s Mystic Gas Plant,
UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-approves-cost-recovery-forexelons-mystic-gas-plant/544978/.
136
See supra note 26 (discussing the statutory origins of this obligation in Federal Power Act
sections 205 and 206).
137
The most dramatic development is the fact that utility-scale wind and solar energy are the least
expensive forms of electric generation on a levelized cost basis, which in turn is driving rapid deployment
of both technologies. See Lazard Levelized Cost of Energy and Levelized Cost of Storage – 2020, LAZARD
(Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-and-levelized-cost-ofstorage-2020/.
138
Rapid technological advancements in extraction of oil and gas, the efficiency of solar panels and
batteries, and telecommunications (“smart grid”) have created sharp change in energy markets over the
last fifteen years; presumably more change is to come. Accordingly, a small-but-growing number of states
have established aggressive goals to eliminate or drastically reduce their carbon emissions in the next few
decades. For example, in California, then-Governor Jerry Brown signed a bill mandating 50% of
California’s electricity to be powered by renewable resources by 2025 and 60% by 2030, while calling
for a “bold path” toward 100% zero-carbon electricity by 2045. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.11 (2019);
Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.15 (2019); Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.30 (2019). Hawaii has established a goal
of 100% renewable electricity sources by 2045. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 269-92 (2016). New York State’s
Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act calls for all the state’s electricity to come from
carbon-free sources by 2030, and for 70% of which must be from renewable sources. N.Y. Env’t Conserv.
Law § 75-0103 (McKinney 2014). The State of Washington’s 2019 Clean Energy Transformation Act
requires all electric utilities in Washington to transition to carbon-neutral electricity by 2030. Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 19.285.040 (West 2019). New Mexico has mandated that the state’s publicly regulated
utilities receive all of their electricity from carbon-free sources by 2045. Energy Transition Act, 2019
NM S.B. 489 (official classification pending). And other states are establishing ambitious goals that
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Maintaining an affordable, reliable electricity supply139 is already consuming
a large share of FERC’s attention.140 This transformation is uncharted
territory for the electricity sector, entailing a multitude of high-stakes
contested decisions about where and when to build new infrastructure and
how to balance competing values and interests—all in a complex, fastmoving market. As that transformation continues apace, it will require FERC
to be able to react nimbly to police and shape the market toward statutory
objectives.
Moreover, Powhatan errs when it insinuates that FERC’s power to
enforce the statute as it has is somehow un-American or contrary to
constitutional design. The tone of the pleadings and of Powhatan’s public
posture about the litigation reflects a misplaced sense of outrage at the notion
that any executive branch agency might ever enforce statutes as FERC has
in this case. 141 In this sense, the Powhatan attack on FERC echoes recent
Republican critiques of delegation 142 and the dangers of the “deep state”; 143
like those critiques, it misapprehends the purpose, origins, and inevitability
of the modern administrative state. The administrative state is both
constitutional and inevitable. The framers appreciated that Congress could

nevertheless stop short of complete elimination of carbon emissions: for example, Minnesota law
establishes a goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050. Minn. Stat. § 216H.02 (2007).
139
This is no small feat as intermittent renewable generation commands an increasing share of the
generation market. For a sample of the kinds of tradeoff choices a zero carbon emission grid poses, see,
e.g., Jesse D. Jenkins, Fernando J. de Sisternes & Richard K. Lester, The Role of Firm, Low-Carbon
Electricity Resources in Deep Decarbonization of Power Generation, 2 JOULE 2403 (2018) (modeling
the cost of a low-carbon grid); Scott P. Burger, Jesse D. Jenkins, Samuel C. Huntington & Ignacio J.
P. . .rez-Arriaga, Why Distributed? A Critical Review of the Tradeoffs Between Centralized and
Decentralized Resources, 17 IEEE POWER & ENERGY MAG. 16 (2019) (analyzing the cost and regressive
nature of particular policies designed to incentivize distributed generation).
140
See Orders 764 and 745, supra note 33.
141
Powhatan seemed to reserve special enmity for then-FERC Chair Norman Bay, going so far as
to create a parody Twitter account, which it used to mock Chairperson Bay. As of this writing, the account
still exists, but has been inactive since June 2020. See Norm Bay’s Parody Account
(@Norm_Bay_Parody), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/norm_bay_parody.
142
Powhatan’s Twitter account has retweeted others citing Philip Hamburger’s work criticizing the
demise of the nondelegation doctrine. Hamburger has been perhaps the most consistent critic of
delegation, and his criticisms have quite rightly fallen on mostly deaf ears in the courts. For a recent
summary of the century-old debate over nondelegation in the courts and legal academy, and Hamburger’s
position within it, see Kristin E. Hickman, Gundy, Nondelegation, and Never-Ending Hope, REG. REV.
(July 8, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/08/hickman-nondelegation/.
143
In the words of one Trump White House lawyer: “Article I is the Congress, Article II is the
President. Article III are the courts. And then there’s this administrative state, combining all
three . . . . They make the law, they enforce the law, and then they decide who violates the law, destroying
the constitutional separation of powers that was designed to protect individual liberty.” Miller, supra note
12.
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not and should not execute the laws, and so vested that power in the
executive branch. 144 As courts have recognized, the delegation of
policymaking discretion to regulatory agencies is therefore consistent with
the founders’ objective to design a policy process that minimizes political
rent-seeking 145 and favors deliberation—one that insulates policymaking
from the passions of faction and pushes it toward “the permanent interests of
the community.” 146 The courts have allowed the scope of that delegation to
be broad because good decisions require the application of expertise and
deliberation to difficult policy problems. 147 It would be inefficient to allocate
all important discretionary decisions about the regulation of markets to
Congress. Congress lacks the time and resources to develop the necessary
issue-specific expertise and to deliberate over such an enormous range of
important issues. These are some of the good reasons why the founders put
that task in the hands of the Executive and authorized the President to appoint
subordinates to manage that task. They are also part of the reason why the
long-dormant nondelegation doctrine withered over time.148 Government is
an organization, and delegation is the natural (indeed, inevitable) response
as organizations grow in size and complexity to match the growth and
complexity of tasks they have been assigned. Thus, when Congress delegates
to FERC the power to make decisions about how to ensure just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory rates—and the associated power to define and punish

144
Article II of the Constitution explicitly contemplates that Congress will create executive branch
offices to be filled by the president’s appointees and that those “public Ministers and Consuls [and] other
Officers” will execute the laws. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
145
The very notion of executive independence arose in response to the corruption and rent-seeking
that plagued the patronage-based system of the American republic’s first 100 years. As a political scientist
in the nineteenth century, Woodrow Wilson authored one of the more thorough arguments for insulating
the executive branch from political influence. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL.
SCI. Q. 197 (1887); see also FRANK GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION (1900); Max Weber,
Bureaucracy, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 63 (Jay M. Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds.,
1978). While these advocates of an apolitical “science of administration” never realized their ambition of
purging politics from the executive function (nor could they have), the notion that expertise and
deliberation produce better decisions, all else equal, remains axiomatically true.
146
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO.
L.J. 97, 142 (2000); see also JOHN ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986) (making the argument that the executive branch now provides the
deliberation that the Senate no longer can).
147
The literature on delegation and the nondelegation doctrine is far too large to cite here. For a
brief explanation of the moribund nature of the nondelegation doctrine and its possible resurrection as
part of the conservative project to transform the administrative state, see Hickman, supra note 142. For a
review of the political science literature on delegation, see Spence & Cross, supra note 146, at 99–102.
148
Hickman, supra note 142.
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manipulation of markets—it is fulfilling (not contradicting) the
constitutional design. 149
Of course, using delegation to limit or mitigate the deleterious effects of
political influence over executive branch deliberations poses the risk that
those deliberations will produce decisions that are undemocratic—that is,
decisions that are inconsistent with the public interest and unresponsive to
expressions of that interest. That concern is answered by elementary
principles of administrative law, which establish that the courts ensure
accountability to the public interest in two ways: first, by ensuring that
agency decisions remain within the boundaries of their enabling legislation;
and second, by holding those decisions to the various procedural
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 150 The former
requirement ensures that the agency responds to the only legislative
expression of the public interest that has the force of law (the statute); 151 the
latter requirement affords the public the right to participate in administrative
processes and requires agencies to respond to that participation in various
ways. 152
In this way, recent critiques of the regulatory state conflate unhappiness
with the substance of regulation—congressionally authorized interference in
the market—with the wisdom of delegation. Courts should not fall prey to
that same confusion. If administrative law doctrines advising judicial
deference to executive branch agencies are indeed evolving in ways that
portend less room for the exercise of discretion by agencies, that would
hamstring future regulators irrespective of their ideological inclination. 153
149
See Spence & Cross, supra note 146; see also Anthony M. Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, The
Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress,
55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 767 (2011) (suggesting that polarization has upset the original constitutional design,
one that was based on the interaction of deliberation and a strong electoral connection).
150
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.
151
Given that no other form of congressional action entails commitment to a position by the full
body, one can argue that enacting legislation represents the only way that Congress expresses any
recognizable version of the majority will.
152
The Administrative Procedures Act not only affords the public notice and the right to comment
on certain agency actions, it also established judicial review standards that force the agency to make
decisions based upon the public record and to respond to public comment. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–57
(establishing notice and participation rights for the public); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (establishing general
standards of judicial review of agency action, apart from those contained in agencies’ enabling
legislation).
153
Considerable academic attention has been devoted recently to the evolution of the so-called
Chevron and Auer deference doctrines, and the “major questions” doctrine. Some of that commentary
addresses the possibility that the Supreme Court may be ready to narrow the permissible scope of
administrative agency discretion. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 US 837
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Opposition to judicial deference or to broad delegations of discretion to
agencies is sometimes premised on the assumption that agency discretion is
most often exercised in favor of liberal (read: pro-regulatory) policy
objectives. But in the context of agency efforts to steer competitive energy
markets in socially desirable directions, the proper scope of the agency’s
discretionary decision-making authority is orthogonal to the ideological
component of its policy objectives at any point in time. This is because what
FERC considers socially desirable in electricity markets changes over time:
different FERC commissioners weigh the tradeoffs between reliability, cost
and environmental performance differently, and differently under different
circumstances. Consequently, FERC sometimes intervenes in markets to
pursue left-wing policy objectives (such as greening the electric grid), 154 and
sometimes it intervenes in order to pursue right wing objectives (such as
preservation of fossil fuel resources). 155 Commissioners of all ideological
stripes seem satisfied with market pricing and competition, appreciative of
the volatility and complexity of electricity markets, and wary of the kind of
calamity that befell the California market in 2000–2001. Their ideological
differences play out in other ways, but they all need to retain the authority
and flexibility to respond to an ever-changing market.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes obscure cases implicate fundamentally important principles.
The overcharge cases involve arcane rules of energy trading; indeed, the
particular rules at the heart of the dispute have already been changed. Yet the
cases reflect a more important and fundamental divide: the polarization(1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). A full treatment of those issues is beyond the scope of this
Essay. For a sampling of the most recent literature addressing these issues, see Michael Coenen & Seth
Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017); Jeffrey Pojanowski, The Future
of Chevron Deference: Of Zombie Fungus and Acoustic Separation, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-future-of-chevron-deference-of-zombie-fungusand-acoustic-separation-by-jeffrey-pojanowski/; Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific
Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095 (2016); Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions about the Major
Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (2016); Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making
Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2016); Kevin O. Leske,
Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 479 (2016).
154
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
155
See, e.g., Order Establishing Just and Reasonable Rate, Calpine Corp., et al. v. PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. & PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Nos. EL16-49-000 & EL18-178-001, 169 FERC
¶ 61,239 (Dec. 19, 2019) (approving rules favoring the participation of fossil fuel generators in the PJM
capacity market); Order Accepting Agreement, Subject to Condition, and Directing Briefs, Constellation
Mystic Power, LLC, No. ER18-1639-000, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267 (Dec. 20, 2018) (authorizing an ad hoc
financial support agreement to a gas-fired plant).
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driven conflict between competing faiths that has beset the regulatory state.
That conflict presents a false choice. Regulation that empowers regulators to
regulate the forest as well as the trees—not the abandonment of markets or
the neutering of regulators—is the one true faith, at least for electricity
markets. This faith may be ideologically impure or muddled, but it has many
adherents because it works. Institutional changes precipitated by FERC (not
courts or politicians) have: (i) opened up the electricity generation sector to
competition that reduced wholesale market rates; 156 (ii) allowed market
participants to look to the financial sector to hedge price risks; 157 and
(iii) opened electricity markets to greener energy resources. 158 FERC
engages in institutional tinkering and enforcement actions limiting the ability
of market participants to engage in manipulative trading that extracts value
from consumers without providing a commensurate benefit. This is as it
should be.
Neither idealized textbook notions of self-correcting markets nor
caricatures of inept or corrupt regulators ought to steer the courts away from
established principles of law that grant agencies like FERC the power to
regulate both the forest and the trees. If courts deny regulators the discretion
to regulate flexibly—to adapt, to react nimbly and quickly to the
machinations of financial players like the defendants in the overcharge
cases—buyers and sellers of energy may grow dissatisfied, sensing that they
have become the “dumb money” 159 in the market. State regulators and
politicians may not view competitive markets as the best way to realize the
objectives of state energy policy. For all of these reasons, federal courts
ought to reject the idea that the only way regulators can enforce the law is by
promulgating specific ex ante rules outlawing specific behaviors. In
electricity markets (and perhaps in most markets), that is a prescription for

156

See Order 888, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Wholesale Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,099,
125 FERC ¶ 61,071 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order 719)
(clarifying the role of financial institutions in wholesale electricity markets).
158
See Credit Reforms in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,942, 133 FERC
¶ 61,060 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Oct. 27, 2010) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order 741); Order
745, supra note 33 and accompanying text; Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 83 Fed. Reg. 9,580, 162 FERC
¶ 61,127 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Mar. 6, 2018) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order 841).
159
This term refers to the unsophisticated players in securities markets. See Daniel Gross, You and
Your Dumb Money, SLATE (Aug. 11, 2005), https://slate.com/business/2005/08/why-you-are-dumbmoney.html (explaining why individual investors are the dumb money in a stock market, and banks and
institutional investors are the “smart money”).
157
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rent-seeking that renders the agency’s statutory mandate impossible to
fulfill.

